CCPS vs Preferred Equity: Which Structure Costs Founders More at Exit? (With Indian Case Studies)
- Dugain Advisors
- Jul 15
- 2 min read

When a VC demands CCPS instead of preferred equity, most founders don't ask why. They assume it's standard. They assume it costs the same. They assume wrong. By exit, that single term sheet choice can cost founders crores.
Here's the uncomfortable math: a CCPS with a 1x non-participating preference looks cheaper at signing. At exit, when you're dividing the sale proceeds, the same CCPS structure often produces a lower founder payout than straight preferred equity would have.
Understanding the Two Liquidation Preference Styles
Most founders confuse CCPS with liquidation preference structure. They're not the same. CCPS is the instrument; liquidation preference is a term within that instrument.
Non-participating preference (more founder-friendly): the investor gets to choose at exit — either their 1x return, or convert to equity and take their pro-rata share, whichever is higher. They do not get both.
Participating preference (investor-friendly): the investor takes their 1x return first, then also participates in remaining proceeds as if they had converted to equity. This 'double dip' structure increases investor payouts dramatically in mid-range exit scenarios.
CCPS vs Preferred Equity: The Real Founder Cost
With anti-dilution clauses, CCPS often hurts more. A Series A CCPS includes an anti-dilution clause that adjusts the conversion ratio if a future funding round happens at a lower valuation. Standard practice is weighted average anti-dilution, which penalizes the founder's stake proportionally.
If the next round is a deep down round, the Series A anti-dilution adjustment can eat 3-7% of your fully-diluted cap table. For a ₹100 crore exit, that's ₹3-7 crore lost.
Checklist: Five Questions to Ask Before Signing CCPS
Is the liquidation preference non-participating, participating, or tiered?
What triggers conversion?
What is the anti-dilution formula?
Does the CCPS have accrued dividend terms?
If the company undergoes a down round, which investor gets their liquidation preference satisfied first?
Getting this math right requires a cap table model that runs exit waterfall scenarios. Dugain's Virtual CFO advisory includes explicit cap table modeling on CCPS exit scenarios because understanding the liquidation preference is what separates founders who lose crores from founders who don't.
Ready to model your own exit scenarios? Talk to Dugain's Virtual CFO team about cap table structuring before your next term sheet.




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